Sudan’s ongoing massacre- State collapse and humanitarian crises

Structural and Historical understanding of Sudan: Ongoing crises

With more than 14 million people displaced, the ongoing war in Sudan highlights “the devastation caused by the current civil war, but the conflict is by no means Sudan’s first encounter with war and destruction.” It is important to note that Sudan has faced the longest civil war in Africa since its independence. (The Structural Roots of Sudan’s Ongoing Devastation – Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, 2025).

The current war, now stretching into its third year, reflects the extent of devastation with reference to the mode of governance and the larger question of ignorance by the international community. “The reasons for this devastation lie in structural factors shaping the country’s economy and demography, as well as the accumulated harms caused by decades of intermittent war.” (The Structural Roots of Sudan’s Ongoing Devastation – Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, 2025).

Before the eruption of the conflict on April 23, 2023, there was widespread discontent among the citizens of Sudan, who were struggling with issues of development, employment, and resource management. “Moreover, this access was highly uneven geographically: the majority of the electrical infrastructure was concentrated in Khartoum and the neighbouring state of Gezira, with only precarious connections reaching a few urban centres in peripheral states.” (The Structural Roots of Sudan’s Ongoing Devastation – Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, 2025).

Access to electricity was confined to only 30 to 50 percent of the population, leading to large-scale grievances among local communities. These concerns over development, economic mismanagement, and concentration of privileges laid the foundation for the rise of armed groups in Sudan.

Another crucial strategy adopted by successive governments in Sudan was the suppression of dissent through the creation of paramilitary groups — a strategy that proved effective for a long period. One such group eventually evolved into the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). “The RSF seized control of the capital in April 2023 and expanded its control to Gezira by December of that year — the first time in Sudanese history that warfare reached the nation’s economic heartland. The consequences extended far beyond the immediate geography of military operations.” (The Structural Roots of Sudan’s Ongoing Devastation – Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, 2025).

The current war is marked by unprecedented violence against humanity, but a crucial underlying factor is chronic underdevelopment and widespread suffering. The violence perpetrated by the RSF, SAF, and allied forces reflects long-established patterns of systemic violence. The areas under RSF influence are characterized by chaos and “fragmented governance through decentralized gangs with loose ties to a central leadership, widespread random violence, rapes, and systematic looting as both a recruitment tool and a reward for fighters. These are not new tactics — the same strategies were employed by the RSF in Darfur and other parts of Sudan for 20 years. The only difference now is that they are no longer taking place under the orders of the central government, but indeed against them.” (The Structural Roots of Sudan’s Ongoing Devastation – Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, 2025).

Governance Failures and Political Mismanagement

Since the establishment of South Sudan as a sovereign state, “the government has largely squandered its economic potential and political goodwill, becoming a kleptocracy where political power is leveraged to secure wealth. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 between Sudan and the SPLA was followed by a large increase in government funds. Plus, South Sudan has been dominated by a rotating set of elites who move seamlessly between positions in government and the frontlines of the rebellion, as political situations change.” (Dessalegn, 2017).

The ruling parties often confined power to loyalists, particularly along ethnic lines. Over time, the nation became deeply entrenched in corruption. In 2012, President Salva Kiir’s ministry was accused of embezzling $4 billion from state funds, of which only 1.5 percent was recovered. Out of this, only a fraction was reinvested in national development.

“Significant economic inequalities between regions, particularly between the more affluent north and the marginalized south, have been a persistent source of tension. The unequal distribution of resources and development opportunities has exacerbated regional grievances and fueled separatist movements.” (Sudan, 2025).

Moreover, Sudan’s oil economy is largely controlled by the central government, with most of its wealth never reaching local communities or contributing to broader national development. According to Transparency International, much of the wealth generated from this sector was siphoned off by elites within the National Congress Party, leaving little room for reinvestment. This concentration of wealth fueled conflicts in Darfur and South Kordofan, where residents saw no benefit from the country’s resource wealth. The lack of transparency undermined the sector’s potential to generate inclusive economic growth. Here, the concept of the “resource curse” becomes a key factor in the continuation of conflict.

Conflict over Natural Resources: Resource Curse and Geopolitical Interests

“Just before the war started in April 2023, Sudan was the fourth-largest gold producer in Africa and 16th globally. Its gold trade amounted to over $2 billion. However, the illegal gold export in Sudan is estimated to be two to three times higher than the official records. The informal nature of much of Sudan’s gold production leads to significant economic activity but also results in substantial revenue losses due to smuggling and a lack of regulation. Estimates suggest that between 50% and 80% of Sudan’s gold produced is smuggled to the United Arab Emirates and Europe, either through South Sudan or directly by militia operating in the gold-mining regions through Chad and Libya.” (Citizen, 2024).

Illegal gold smuggling plays a crucial role in the continuation of Sudan’s larger conflict, involving RSF and other armed militia groups. “The April 2023 investigations stated that before the conflict, both Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s military, and RSF leader Dagalo previously received backing from Russia.” (Citizen, 2024).

This alliance allowed Moscow access to Sudan’s gold-rich regions in exchange for political and military support. “The 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the wave of sanctions that followed accelerated Russia’s gold plunder in Sudan and further propped up military rule, increasing Wagner activity in the country.” (Citizen, 2024).

Regions such as Russia, Chad, Yemen, and Eastern Libya serve as important smuggling routes, offering military, logistical, and training support to RSF-linked forces. “In 2014, Human Rights Watch estimated that RSF had 5,000 to 6,000 fighters; in 2023, numbers were estimated to be at least 100,000 fighters. Both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and RSF were recruited as ground troops for the Saudi-Emirati coalition in Yemen, with it being particularly well-paying for the RSF.” (Citizen, 2024).

This illegal smuggling deprives the Sudanese government of crucial tax revenues that could have been used for welfare and infrastructure development. Beyond hampering development, it perpetuates poverty and fuels ongoing conflicts. “Over 90% of Sudan’s gold is smuggled out of the country, where it is refined and exported to international markets. This hampers Sudan’s economic growth, perpetuates poverty in resource-rich areas, and fuels conflicts.” (Citizen, 2024).

However, the UAE is not the only external actor involved. “Egypt firmly backs al-Burhan, viewing him as a bulwark against regional instability and concerned about the potential impact of a chaotic Sudan on the Nile River, Egypt’s lifeline. Saudi Arabia offers diplomatic support to Burhan, prioritizing stability in the region. Meanwhile, Iran is reportedly supplying drones to the Sudanese army, aligning with Burhan to counter the UAE’s support for the RSF – a reflection of the broader geopolitical rivalry between Tehran and Abu Dhabi. Turkey’s role is murky, with alleged drone supplies denied, despite historical ties to Sudan. Even Russia, despite the disruption caused by the Wagner Group’s demise, remains deeply interested, seeking a potential naval base on the Red Sea.” (Carter, 2025).

The Historic Interest of Russia in Fueling the Conflict

Sudan’s geostrategic location, particularly its access to the Red Sea, grants it immense geopolitical value. “Historically, Sudan has been of interest to Russia since Soviet times and later under Lt. General Ibrahim Abboud, the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and Prime Minister of Sudan, when he visited the USSR. However, the formal development of mutual recognition emerged in 1986 when the elected prime minister of Sudan, Al Sadiq Al Mahadi, visited the USSR to strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries.” (Abdalla, 2024).

“Russia’s foreign policy has been hostile to Western and American hegemony and seeks to undermine the global power structure. For Russia, Africa is at the heart of this strategy, as it is the space where the West exercises its domination most, besides Russia’s narrative of prioritizing economic interests on the continent. Seemingly, Russia’s foreign policy priorities have been in harmony with those of African elites who hold anti-Western sentiments. Consequently, the last decade witnessed intensive Russian diplomatic initiatives in Africa to build partnerships that align with Russia’s geostrategic, political, and economic goals.” (Abdalla, 2024).

The Wagner Group played a significant role in advancing these objectives. “Although the Wagner group’s presence there was identified as protecting Russian companies in Africa, in reality, the Wagner group’s role extended to establishing economic relations in extractive activities such as natural resource mining. Politically, the Wagner Group helped Russia establish links and political alliances on the continent. In addition, the Wagner group has established military relations in Africa by providing weapon support, military training, and security services to sympathetic regimes.” (Abdalla, 2024).

In 2017, relations between Khartoum and Moscow peaked when former President al-Bashir visited Russia, requesting Putin’s protection from U.S. hostility in exchange for making Sudan “Russia’s gateway to Africa.” This meeting granted Russia extensive mining rights in Sudan and paved the way for Wagner’s deep involvement in the country’s extractive sector. “In parallel, Russia has been a strong supporter of Sudan in international forums such as the UN Security Council. In 2017, Russian officials sided with the Sudanese government and pushed for a gradual reduction of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur — a peacekeeping force — to be replaced by Sudanese troops.” (Abdalla, 2024).

Following the 2021 coup led by the SAF and RSF, the relationship between the Wagner Group and RSF deepened further. “Hemedti’s visit to Moscow in 2022, on the same day Russia launched its war in Ukraine, and his reception by high-ranking Russian officials marked an official inauguration of the partnership between Russia and the RSF. Through RSF facilitation — which controlled much of Sudan’s gold industry — the Wagner Group expanded its economic activities and secured lucrative gold mining concessions in Darfur and Blue Nile State. For Russia, alignment with Hemedti provided channels to smuggle gold from Sudan to Russia via Dubai, helping Moscow multiply its reserves and survive Western sanctions imposed after its invasion of Ukraine.” (Abdalla, 2024).

Conclusion

The analysis reflects that Sudan’s prolonged crises stem from governance failures, economic mismanagement, and the resource curse. The interlinkage of economic inequality and political corruption has created fertile ground for the rise of armed groups like the RSF, resulting in enduring violence. This humanitarian catastrophe demands urgent attention, as the international community’s muted response underscores a broader failure to address Sudan’s collapse. The study highlights how Sudan’s abundance of natural resources has paradoxically attracted complex geopolitical interests, hindering the path toward peace, stability, and cooperation.

References

Abdalla, S. (2024). Emerging Stage for Great Power Competition: Russia’s Influence in Sudan amid Political Turmoil. Securityincontext.org. https://www.securityincontext.org/posts/emerging-stage-for-great-power-competition-russias-influence-in-sudan-amid-political-turmoil

Citizen, O. (2024, November 19). Illegal Gold Trade: Why Sudan and South Sudan are at Crossroads? One Citizen Daily Newspaper. https://www.onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2024/11/19/illegal-gold-trade-why-sudan-and-south-sudan-are-at-crossroads/

Carter, J. (2025, November 8). Sudan Conflict: Foreign Powers & the Gold Rush. Archyde. https://www.archyde.com/sudan-conflict-foreign-powers-the-gold-rush/

Dessalegn, A. (2017). The Cause and Consequence of Conflict in South Sudan. Inter. J. Polit. Sci. Develop, 5(1), 15–21. https://doi.org/10.14662/IJPSD2016.063

The Structural Roots of Sudan’s Ongoing Devastation – Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung. (2025, June 12). Rosalux.de. https://www.rosalux.de/en/news/id/53506/the-structural-roots-of-sudans-ongoing-devastation