Disclaimer: It is important to emphasise that Boko Haram’s ideology does not represent Islam or the wider Muslim population. The overwhelming majority of Nigerian Muslims reject Boko Haram’s violence and distortion of Islamic teachings.
Terrorism is widely recognised as a complex phenomenon shaped by multiple factors, including ideological motivations, political objectives, social grievances, and the strategic use of violence against non-combatants. Most scholarly definitions emphasise the deliberate targeting of civilians to create fear and influence political outcomes. Omenma et al. (2020) highlight that terrorism involves purposeful violence aimed at shaping long-term political, religious, or social goals. Similarly, O’Neil, a scholar from Indiana University, defines terrorism as “a form of warfare in which violence is directed primarily against non-combatants,” noting that insurgent terrorism is calculated and goal-oriented rather than mindless aggression (Omenma et al., 2020).
It is essential to distinguish between the concepts of insurgency and terrorism, as these terms are often used interchangeably despite having different meanings. Insurgency refers to a prolonged armed struggle waged by a group seeking to overthrow an existing government or gain control over specific territory, often relying on guerrilla tactics and local support. Terrorism, on the other hand, is the deliberate use of violence or intimidation against civilians to advance political, ideological, or religious objectives (Insurgency vs. Terrorism – This vs. That, 2023). In this regard, Boko Haram exhibits characteristics of both an insurgent group and a terrorist organisation, combining guerrilla warfare with targeted attacks against civilians to further its broader strategic aims.
Boko Haram originated as a small religious movement in Yobe State, northeastern Nigeria, in 2002, led by the Salafi preacher Mohamed Yusuf. In its early phase, the group portrayed itself as a reformist movement advocating a return to what it considered a purer version of Islam, framing this as a response to corruption, poverty, and weak governance in northern Nigeria. Its rhetoric centred on social grievances and moral decline rather than violence (Humanitarian Practice Network, 2022). Importantly, Boko Haram’s ideology represented a fringe interpretation that was rejected by mainstream Muslim scholars and communities in Nigeria.
The group’s transformation into a violent organisation accelerated following the death of Yusuf in police custody in 2009. Under Abubakar Shekau’s leadership, Boko Haram adopted more extreme tactics, including large-scale attacks, targeted assassinations, and the use of women and children as suicide bombers. Mass abductions, such as the Chibok kidnapping, signalled a shift towards brutal terror strategies. By 2013, the Nigerian government formally designated Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation due to the escalation of violence.
The consequences of Boko Haram’s insurgency have been severe. More than 15 million people in Nigeria and neighbouring countries have been affected by the conflict, with widespread displacement, loss of livelihoods, and destruction of infrastructure (Felbab-Brown, 2018). Boko Haram continues to attack civilians, abduct individuals, destroy markets, mosques, and schools, and target internally displaced persons (IDP) camps (Omenma et al., 2020). According to the Global Terrorism Index (2019), Nigeria ranked as the second most impacted country by terrorism, largely due to Boko Haram’s activities. Suicide attacks have increasingly contributed to the death toll, undermining public confidence in state institutions (Campbell & Harwood, 2018).
Socio-economic and ethnic dynamics have also facilitated Boko Haram’s expansion. Many of its early recruits came from the Kanuri ethnic group and the economically marginalised communities of northeastern Nigeria. Although initially supported by some northern elites and businessmen, the group’s evolution into a violent extremist organisation distanced it from the broader Muslim population. Over time, Boko Haram developed an extensive network involving arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and cross-border movement of fighters through Chad and Niger. Widespread corruption, limited economic opportunities, and deepening inequality created conditions that the group exploited to recruit vulnerable youth.
Boko Haram claims religious legitimacy, but its ideology is strongly rejected by the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Nigeria and globally. The group promotes a radical Salafi-jihadi interpretation that diverges sharply from mainstream Sunni Islam. As Thurston (2016) notes, Boko Haram’s leaders assert the authority to declare Muslim leaders apostates and aim to impose an extreme version of Islamic law, drawing selectively from global jihadi movements to justify their actions. However, Muslim scholars across West Africa have repeatedly condemned Boko Haram as un-Islamic. The group also rejects Western education, interpreting it as a source of moral corruption, and has increasingly relied on suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to advance its agenda. Boko Haram has further strengthened its global relevance through its alliance with ISIS, adopting tactics such as public executions and territorial control (ISS Africa, 2015).
Environmental factors, particularly the ecological degradation of Lake Chad, have played a significant role in exacerbating the conflict. The shrinking of Lake Chad due to climate change has led to declining agricultural productivity, increased food insecurity, and loss of livelihoods. These conditions have created fertile ground for recruitment, as affected populations seek alternatives for survival. Boko Haram has exploited this vulnerability by establishing a shadow economy centred on taxation, resource extraction, and control of trade routes around the lake, especially near Baga (Nyelade, 2025). Climate-related challenges, including drought and erratic rainfall, have intensified competition for resources and fuelled community tensions (Cammarano, 2024). As environmental pressures increase poverty, displacement, and marginalisation, Boko Haram capitalises on the resulting instability by offering material incentives and a sense of belonging to disenfranchised youth.
Conclusion and Policy Analysis:
The evolution of Boko Haram reflects the interplay of political, socio-economic, environmental, and ideological factors in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin. Government policy failures, weak security institutions, and environmental degradation have created conditions in which Boko Haram continues to operate across borders. Strengthening cybersecurity infrastructure is essential to counter Boko Haram’s increasing use of digital platforms for propaganda and recruitment. Similarly, expanding digital literacy and community-based media awareness at the grassroots level can help build resilience against extremist narratives.
The resurgence of Boko Haram in 2025, despite years of counterterrorism efforts, indicates that current strategies remain inadequate. Renewed violence in Borno and North Central Nigeria reflects shifts in Boko Haram’s leadership, territorial ambitions, and exploitation of neglected communities. Rivalries between Boko Haram and ISWAP, combined with inconsistent regional military cooperation, have further complicated the security landscape. Addressing the crisis requires an integrated approach that prioritises governance reforms, community engagement, climate adaptation strategies, youth employment, and strengthened cross-border coordination.
Overall, Boko Haram’s actions are driven by extremist ideology and structural vulnerabilities—not by Islam or the Muslim population, who have been among the primary victims and strongest opponents of the group. A comprehensive policy response must therefore combine security measures with long-term social, economic, and environmental interventions.
References
Cammarano, E. (2024, June 20). The Hidden Crisis of Lake Chad: How Environmental Degradation Fuels Boko Haram – Katoikos. Katoikos. https://katoikos.world/analysis/the-hidden-crisis-of-lake-chad-how-environmental-degradation-fuels-boko-haram.html
ibrahim , J. (2018). About the RepoRt. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-12/sr_437_civilian_led_governance_and_security_in_nigeria_0.pdf
Insurgency vs. Terrorism – What’s the Difference? | This vs. That. (2023). This vs. That. https://thisvsthat.io/insurgency-vs-terrorism
Nyelade, R. (2025). Military force isn’t the solution for Lake Chad Basin conflict: the key is rebuilding local economies. https://doi.org/10.64628/aaj.4e5u5wnyx
Omenma, J. T., Onyishi, I. E., & Okolie, A.-M. (2020). A decade of Boko Haram activities: the attacks, responses and challenges ahead. Security Journal, 33. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00231-9
The evolution and impact of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin | Humanitarian Practice Network. (2022a, February 14). Humanitarian Practice Network. https://odihpn.org/en/publication/the-evolution-and-impact-of-boko-haram-in-the-lake-chad-basin/
Thurston, A. (2016). The Disease Is unbelief: Boko Haram’s Religious and Political Worldview. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Brookings-Analysis-Paper_Alex-Thurston_Final_Web.pdf
Arnab’s core research interests lie in political engagement, digital activism, youth participation, and contemporary international relations, reflecting his commitment to understanding the evolving dynamics of politics both in India and globally..